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The LHC Beam Dumping System nominally dumps the beam synchronously with the passage of 
the particle free beam abort gap at the beam dump extraction kickers. In the case of an 
asynchronous beam dump the TCDQ absorber protects the machine aperture. It is a single sided 
collimator, positioned close to the beam and it has to follow the beam position and beam size 
during the energy ramp. 
This report assesses the different failure scenarios of TCDQ positioning and their likelihood. The 
failure probability for the two TCDQ systems together is estimated to be 3.6 E-05 (mean value) 
for one year of LHC operation. This corresponds to a SIL4 safety level, which is considered 
sufficient. The three dominant failure modes are highlighted. 
The calculated failure probability refers to scenarios that are generated and developed inside the 
TCDQ system. Potential failure sources not included are the interaction with external systems: 
the transmission of the start signal to the PLC from a dedicated timing card and the manual 
optimisation of the TCDQ position by the operator. The sensitivity of the TCDQ system to these 
failures is also discussed and recommendations to address these vulnerabilities are made. 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 3 
2.  TCDQ SYSTEM DESCRIPTION ................................................................................. 3 
2.1.  Safety considerations during the TCDQ design process ..................................... 3 
2.2.  TCDQ functioning principles and its operational modes ................................... 4 
2.2.1  PLC control function .............................................................................................. 4 
2.2.2  PLC interlock functions .......................................................................................... 6 
2.3.  Scope of the study ................................................................................................... 7 
2.3.1  Scope and limitations .............................................................................................. 7 
3.  MODELLING AND ANALYSIS OF THE TCDQ FAILURE – THE STUDY 
TASKS ....................................................................................................................................... 8 
3.1.  Introduction ............................................................................................................ 8 
3.2.  Risk assessment following the IEC 61508 standard ............................................ 9 
3.3.  System analysis tasks ........................................................................................... 10 
4.  FAILURE MODEL ....................................................................................................... 11 
4.1.  The failure scenario analysis ............................................................................... 11 
4.2.  Analysis of function/system failures ................................................................... 11 
4.3.  Components and failure events ........................................................................... 13 
4.4.  Data analysis – estimation of event probabilities .............................................. 14 
4.5.  Dependencies and common cause failures ......................................................... 14 
4.6.  Quantification ....................................................................................................... 14 
5.  RESULTS AND INSIGHTS ......................................................................................... 15 
5.1.  Overview of results ............................................................................................... 15 
5.2.  Cut sets (failure combinations) and vulnerabilities .......................................... 15 
5.2.1  Minimal Cut Set No. 1: PLC-TIMING-CARD .................................................... 15 
5.2.2  Minimal Cut Set No. 2 and 3: PLC-CPU-SW ...................................................... 16 
5.2.3  Minimal Cut Set No. 4: ETHERNET-BOARD .................................................... 16 
5.3.  Importance results ................................................................................................ 17 
5.4.  Sensitivity analyses: operation, failure data and human error ........................ 18 
5.4.1  Sensitivity to human error: justification and insights ........................................... 19 
5.5.  Results and SIL ..................................................................................................... 20 
5.6.  Main insights and modifications based on the results ...................................... 21 
6.  CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK ............................................................................ 22 
6.1.  Outcome ................................................................................................................ 22 
6.2.  On-going and future work ................................................................................... 23 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................... 23 
REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................... 23 
APPENDIX A: FAILURE BASIC EVENTS ....................................................................... 24 
APPENDIX B: FAILURE DATA ......................................................................................... 28 







Table of Figures 
Figure 1: State transition diagram of the TCDQ modes of operation. ....................................... 4 
Figure 2: TCDQ functional layout. ............................................................................................ 5 
Figure 3: TCDQ layout of control and supervision functions. ................................................... 5 
Figure 4: Risk related tables from IEC 61508 [6]. ..................................................................... 9 
Figure 5: Risk graph method to determine SIL [6] .................................................................. 10 
Figure 6: Fault tree of TCDQ failure ....................................................................................... 13 
Figure 7: Sensitivity analyses of TCDQ PFD versus operation scenario, failure data and HEP.
 .................................................................................................................................................. 21 
Figure 8: Fault tree of the TCDQ in position tracking ............................................................. 33 
Figure 9: Fault tree of PLC control function of motor 1 in servo mode (doubled triangles are 
CCF sets) .................................................................................................................................. 36 
Figure 10: Fault tree of the PLC control function of motor 1 in servo mode .......................... 36 
Figure 11: Fault tree of TCDQ failure in servo (automatic) hold position .............................. 39 
Figure 12: Fault tree of the PLC control function of motor 1 .................................................. 40 
Figure 13: Fault tree of the PLC CPU that generates spurious control to motor1 ................... 41 
 
Table of Tables 
Table 1: Supervision functions accounted in the study .............................................................. 8 
Table 2: Minimal Cut Sets of the TCDQ ................................................................................. 16 
Table 3: Importance results ...................................................................................................... 17 
Table 4: Parameters ranked by importance (sensitivity) .......................................................... 18 
Table 5: Methods of HEP and HEP figures ............................................................................. 20 
Table 6: failure events .............................................................................................................. 24 
Table 7: Failure rates ................................................................................................................ 28 
Table 8: Probabilities on demand ............................................................................................. 30 
Table 9: Fraction of time used to model contributions from tracking and hold branches and 
human error .............................................................................................................................. 31 
Table 10: CCF sets ................................................................................................................... 31 
Table 11: Failure events of the TCDQ failure fault tree. ......................................................... 32 
Table 12: Failure events of the fault tree TCDQ-TRACKING ................................................ 34 
Table 13: Failure events of the TCDQ-CTRL-SERVO-M1 fault tree ..................................... 36 
Table 14: Failure events of PLC-CTRL-SERVO-M1 .............................................................. 37 
Table 15: Failure events of TCDQ-SERVO-HOLD ................................................................ 39 
Table 16: Failure events of the fault tree PLC-CTRL-SPURIOUS-1 ...................................... 41 
 
Abbreviations 
BIC   – Beam Interlocking Controller 
LHC  – Large Hadron Collider 
MCS  – Management Critical Settings 
PLC  – Programmable Logic Controller 
PID  – Proportional Integral Derivate 
TCDQ  – Target Collimator Dump Quadrupole 
 
 1. Introduction 
The nominal filling scheme of the LHC consists of 2808 bunches. Most bunches are separated 
by 25 ns, but larger beam free gaps exists to allow for the risetime of the injection kickers and 
a gap of 119 bunches (3 µs) allows for the risetime of the beam dump extraction kickers 
MKD. In case of synchronisation problems between the RF system and the beam dumping 
system, a failure in the trigger distribution between the different MKD magnets or in case of 
erratic firing of one of the MKD kickers, several bunches from the beam are swept across the 
LHC aperture. The TCDQ is a movable one-sided collimator positioned upstream of 
superconducting quadrupole Q4 in the beam dump region in IR6 which protects the Q4 and 
the downstream LHC aperture against an asynchronous beam dump. Two TCDQ systems 
exist, one for each beam. 
To correctly protect the LHC aperture, the nominal position of the TCDQ jaw is at about 8σ 
distance from the beam centre, where σ is the beam size. The TCDQ position will have to 
follow the beam during the energy ramp. A movement of several millimetres, with a 
resolution better than 100 µm, is required. The event of an asynchronous beam dump 
together with an incorrectly positioned TCDQ can lead to serious damage to the LHC. 
Details of the TCDQ control system requirements can be found in [1, 2, 3]. The likelihood of 
having an asynchronous beam dump due to faults internal to the beam dumping systems is 
about 1 per year [4]. The likelihood of an asynchronous beam dump due to other reasons, 
like a wrong synchronisation relative to the RF system, has not been quantified but is 
estimated to be of the some order of magnitude. 
The TCDQ position is controlled and supervised by a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), 
which applies a PID control to two DC motors. Errors in the position controls, which lead to 
a wrong positioning of the block, must normally generate an interlock (ILK). The local Beam 
Interlock Controller (BIC) manages these ILKs and issues a beam dump request. The 
operator in the control room plays an active role only when the TCDQ is in remote control 
mode for manual position adjustments. 
This study aims at assessing the probability that the TCDQ is not correctly positioned to 
protect the LHC machine from asynchronous beam dumps. The system failures are modelled 
by a fault tree. A fault tree supports quantitative probabilistic analysis, and returns insights 
on principal system vulnerabilities (internal and external).  
The report is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly summarizes how safety related issues 
have been considered during the design process and highlights the safety-related features of 
the TCDQ and its operational modes. In this section the functioning principles of the TCDQ 
are also described, together with the scope and limitations. Section 3 describes the modelling 
and analysis methodology and how it has been applied to this study. The failure model of 
the TCDQ, with the fault tree of the system, and the data analysis to obtain failure 
probabilities, is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 summarises the results, their interpretation, 
and the insights obtained. Finally, the report concludes with a short discussion of the 
implementation of the study results and provides the outlook for possible future work. 
2. TCDQ system description 
2.1. Safety considerations during the TCDQ design process 
The TCDQ design is not redundant (neither at functional nor at component level) with a few 
exceptions concerning transmission of the ILK to the Beam Interlock Controller. The two 
TCDQ systems are each dedicated to one ring. Unlike other systems in the LHC, the TCDQ is 
not subjected to post-mortem diagnostics. The lack of these measures is compensated by 
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 online supervision of control process quantities, such as the position of the motors, the status 
of components, the integrity of information (e.g. control set points, motor calibration files). 
All the supervised quantities are interlocked; so as to trigger a beam dump request in case of 
detected errors and prevent that failure may lead to unsafe conditions. 
The corresponding safety measures for the TCDQ are documented in the TCDQ software 
specification, control specification and test procedures; see [1, 2, 3].  
2.2. TCDQ functioning principles and its operational modes 
Three views of the TCDQ system are given: a state transition diagram of TCDQ operations, a 
description at functional level, and the layout, shown in Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3, 
respectively. 
Figure 1 describes TCDQ configurations and modes during LHC operation. At the reception 
of the start signal (arm and go), the TCDQ system leaves the ready state and moves to 
tracking. As long as the beam changes its energy, the TCDQ is in tracking configuration and 
servo automatic mode. The system moves to a hold configuration and servo mode when the 
beam energy is fixed. In case of manual adjustment of position, the TCDQ moves to its 
tracking configuration but in remote mode. ILKs are triggered in case of errors and lead to a 
beam dump request.  
The functional architecture of the TCDQ is represented in Figure 2. The functional 
description is useful for a global understanding of processes but may hide implementation 
details that are important for safety assessment. For example, the control and ILK functions 
are represented as separate functions in this figure although they run on the same CPU.  
The system layout at assembly level is shown in Figure 3. The layout shows mapping among 
functions and components, with their signal paths. For example, the control loop function of 
motor 1 is implemented in the PLC PID control, the analogue I/O board (output), the motor 
drive, the DC motor 1, then the potentiometer and again the analogue I/O (input). 
The control function and the supervision function of the TCDQ are presented in more detail 
in the following sections. 
2.2.1 PLC control function 
A simplified layout of the control loop is given in Figure 3. Each motor is driven by the 
respective motor drive. The control inputs to the motor drives are calculated in the PLC PID. 
The ‘trajectory’ of the TCDQ (position versus time) is calculated by the collimator control 
system and transmitted to the TCDQ control system via the Management of Critical Settings 
(MCS). This is translated into set points for the motors. The set points are stored in a table in 
the PLC CPU [1, 2]. 
 
Figure 1: State transition diagram of the TCDQ modes of operation. 
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Figure 3: TCDQ layout of control and supervision functions. 
 5 [2009-03] 
 The movement of the TCDQ blocks starts when the start signal from the timing system is 
issued, and received by a timing card via a dedicated transmission. The initial position is the 
“450 GeV” injection position. The TCDQ is active throughout LHC operation, at LHC 
injection, LHC ramping and when the machine reaches the full energy for colliding beams. 
The most demanding configuration for TCDQ, in term of number of components and 
processes involved, is during position tracking, while ramping and manual adjustments. 
During LHC operation with beam, after the start of the fill, the TCDQ is normally in servo 
automatic mode, controlled by the PLC. In case of fine adjustment of the block position, the 
operator in the control room may control the TCDQ manually by switching the operation 
mode into remote. This mode is identical to the servo mode when the TCDQ is in tracking 
configuration, with the only difference that the set points are provided by the operator in the 
control room. Manual control of TCDQ, i.e. remote mode, is only possible during the 
injection phase and with some restriction during a pause of the ramping phase. It is not 
possible when the LHC is ramping and it should be avoided at top energy. In the present 
study, it is assumed that adjustments in remote are required once every 10 fills, Ref. [5]. 
Between two fills the system is moved back to the injection position. This operation 
challenges the basic functionalities so that it is treated as a functional check for most of 
TCDQ components. If failures occur in the control or the steering of the block, this is detected 
before the next fill. The only components not covered by this check are those devices that do 
not play a role in the controls and steering of the TCDQ, e.g. the supervision functions. 
2.2.2 PLC interlock functions 
Safe operation of the TCDQ is based on the supervision and interlock function. Many 
components of the system, which relate directly or indirectly to the TCDQ positioning, are 
subject to monitoring and verification. Monitoring and verification includes the verification 
of the correctness of component settings (calibration of motors and PID parameters), 
verification of the position during the tracking process (independent verification of two 
motors by error position thresholds, detection of end stop position and emergency stop 
position) and the status of components and internal self-checking of digital electronics (clock, 
bus communications, etc.). Interlocks are also generated in case of failure of a power supply 
and failure in digital transmissions, which are current loops.  
The most important supervision function is the TCDQ position read-back. An ILK is 
triggered if the difference between desired motor position and the actual measurement by 
the potentiometer exceeds a given threshold. These thresholds are stored in a table in the 
PLC CPU as they depend on the beam energy. Another ILK is generated in case the motor 
position measured by the potentiometer and another independent device (LVDT) disagree. 
Tables with position set points are cross-checked every 10 seconds with the original tables in 
the MCS and in case of disagreement another ILK is generated. Also the absence of 
movement of the block to a command is detected and generates an ILK.  
All ILKs generated in the PLC go to the digital I/O board and thereby to the BIC. The signal 
transmission to the BIC is redundant. Position threshold interlocks are modified during the 
ramping phase. In particular, the time window for the position threshold ILK is augmented 
in order to track the TCDQ trajectory with a bigger margin of error [1]. This phase is 
assumed to last 30 minutes and is demanding in term of controls as the position of the TCDQ 
has to be continuously updated. 
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 2.3. Scope of the study 
The study focuses on the TCDQ function to protect the LHC machine. The analysis answers 
the question: “Given an asynchronous beam dump, what is the probability that the TCDQ is 
not in the configuration required to protect the LHC machine elements?” 
The methodology applied is based on systematically 1) postulating potential initiating events 
of failure scenarios, 2) identifying the technical and non-technical “defences” against these 
scenarios, and 3) decomposing the systems and defences into components, their failure 
modes, and the probabilities associated with these. 
The initiating event is the asynchronous beam dump. The mitigation to this event is the 
function of the TCDQ, protecting the LHC elements. The response of the TCDQ is totally 
independent to the causes that generate an asynchronous beam dump.  
The methodology applied in this study is presented in Section 3. The failure models are 
discussed in Section 4. 
2.3.1 Scope and limitations 
The scope credits components that play a role in the TCDQ control and supervision, and the 
failure of which may results into the misplacement of the TCDQ block. The components 
included in the scope are: 
- two DC motors; 
- one diluter block; 
- PLC for PID controls (servo mode and remote mode); 
- PLC for supervision and interlock generation (several functions); 
- PLC self-diagnostics; 
- Boards for analogue, digital I/O communication, ETHERNET communications, ModBus 
communications; 
- devices for measuring and validating the motor position (2 potentiometer, 2 LVDT); 
- devices for detecting end stop position (1 per motor); 
- tables for PID position settings and thresholds, PID parameters and motor calibration. 
The list of supervision functions and self-diagnostics is shown in Table 1. 
Some of the most important limitations of this TCDQ study concern a few not credited 
re some that are demanded only in scenarios that 
parison of the LVDT digital 
sions or simplifications are:  
d in the control chain; 
components or functions, simplifications of feedback signals, and coarse modelling of some 
functions/components or signal paths.  
The omitted features or components a
include several simultaneous and independent failure events.  
Some supervision functions are not credited. They are the com
and analogue values, the emergency stop switch and the emergency button of the TCDQ. 
The reason for these omissions stands in the fact these devices take a secondary role in the 
supervision of the TCDQ. For example, the emergency stop switch is effective only in case 
the end stop switch does not trigger the TCDQ. Temperature controller and flow controller 
are not included either. 
Some other specific omis
1. The operator in the control room is not include
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 2. MCS, timing system and BIC are not included; 
3. Software is not modelled in detail; 
4. Component failures that lead to a safe condition are not included. 
Point 4 of the list concerns most of digital transmissions, which are 3-wire current loops. For 
such an electric wiring, a failure at physical level turns into an ILK with the subsequent beam 
dump. This is true in all failure scenarios with the only exception of a stuck at failure, which 
is taken into account in the model.  
Table 1: Supervision functions accounted in the study 
Supervision functions 
Position tracking Based on error threshold between desired and 
actual position of motors 1 and 2 
Position comparison Based on comparison of positions of motors 1 and 
2 as measured by the potentiometer and LVDT 
Position settings Integrity check of set points in the CPU table with 
values in the MCS  
End stop position Triggers when the TCDQ reaches the end stop 
position 
Block movement check Verification that block is not moving 
Communication check Watch dog for ETHERNET communications 
Calibration file loading Detect if the calibration files of motor 1 and 2 are 
missing at the start of operation 
PID parameters loading Detect if the PID parameters are missing at the 
start of operation 
Motor drive power supply Power supplies of motor drivers 1 and 2 have 
failed 
ADC  Detect a failure in the ADC converter 
Mode of operation The PLC is functioning in the incorrect mode 
(remote plus ramping triggers an ILK) 
Self diagnostics 
CPU Clock CPU clock must be 1 kHz 
PLC bus Bus communications between CPU and I/O 
devices are checked 
PLC rack Detection of general failure of the PLC rack 
3. Modelling and Analysis of the TCDQ Failure – the Study Tasks 
3.1. Introduction 
The safety analysis of the TCDQ verifies whether the system will perform as designed in the 
postulated scenarios, estimates the likelihood of these failures, and identifies the component 
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 and failure modes that are important to the overall risk. The outcome of this analysis is 
complementary to the design process: it provides quantitative evidence on the effectiveness 
of redundancy and diversity to provide barriers and defences against accidents. This 
information also identifies the components and systems that may deserve particular 
attention in maintenance and testing. Modifications to the system, its operation, and its 
maintenance to address the risk-significant vulnerabilities may thus be considered. 
3.2. Risk assessment following the IEC 61508 standard 
This study is not a risk assessment in the sense of the IEC 61508 standard, which considers 
the risk without crediting the safety systems. Still, there are good reasons to outline the 
basics of this methodology, in particular those steps that support in quantitative way the 
estimation of risk reduction that can be obtained by a protection system. The IEC 61508 
safety standard provides three tables to rank risk by consequences and likelihood and 
thereafter to apportion the correct safety requirements to the protection system, see Ref. [6]. 
These tables are shown in Figure 4. The last table accounts for the four safety integrity levels, 
either in term of failure rates or failure on demand. The table with failure on demand is 
chosen when the risk frequency is about or less than 1 per year, which is the case of the 
asynchronous beam dump. The apportionment of safety requirement, namely the Safety 
Integrity Level (SIL), is done by a risk graph method, see Figure 5. Consequences are stated 
first, then the exposure time (fraction of mission time the system is exposed to the risk), the 




Figure 4: Risk related tables from IEC 61508 [6]. 
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Figure 5: Risk graph method to determine SIL [6] 
The risk graph methodology yields a safety integrity level requirement for the TCDQ which 
is SIL4. This results from the consequence of an asynchronous beam dump which is deemed 
catastrophic, i.e. 3 months downtime, more than 100 MCHF (C4), the exposure time which is 
the entire mission time (F2), the probability of avoidance which is null (P2) and the 
probability of asynchronous beam dump which is low, i.e. 0.4 asynchronous beam dumps 
per year from one LBDS (W2). It is important to remark that, in term of risk, no distinction is 
made if an asynchronous beam dump occurs during injection, ramping or top energy phase. 
The consequences are assumed to be identical, which is a kind of conservative assumption. 
Other possible sources of asynchronous beam dump (e.g. the RF system) are not included, 
which is an optimistic assumption. The residual risk likelihood is the product of the 
probability of failure of the TCDQ multiplied by the frequency of the asynchronous beam 
dump per year. 
The goal of this study is to calculate the probability of failure on demand of the TCDQ. 
3.3. System analysis tasks 
This is a brief overview of analysis tasks of the TCDQ. They are arranged according to the 
current practice in Probabilistic Risk Analysis, Ref [7]. These are: 
Initiating event analysis considers how accidents can start. More specifically, it identifies 
the events that require the response of the system to avoid undesired consequences.  
In the present case study, the asynchronous beam dump is the initiating event which is an 
input to the model.  
Accident sequence analysis considers the responses to the system to the initiating event.  
In this case study, TCDQ can be in the right position or misplaced at the time it is demanded. 
No adjustments are possible to recover to the right position. This means that the accident 
sequence consists of just one event: TCDQ is incorrectly positioned and cannot protect the 
LHC machine elements. 
In Systems Analysis, the possible causes for the failure of a function required in the 
scenarios are systematically identified. This is where the failure models are developed. In 
addition to component failures such as mechanical defects, the systems analysis considers 
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 how the system is checked, repaired and returned to service, in terms of its impact on system 
failures. 
Data analysis refers to the estimation of the frequencies of initiating events (the 
asynchronous beam dump) and of the probabilities of the “basic events”. 
Model quantification refers to the failure models which are quantified using the frequencies 
and probabilities of the events. The results of model quantification include 1) the probability 
of accident as the combination of the initiating event frequency (the asynchronous beam 
dump) multiplied by the TCDQ probability of failure, 2) the most probable (dominant) 
failure scenarios and 3) their contributors. The quantitative contribution of the failure events 
are measured with importance values. These provide a ranking of the contributions that 
identify what is important and risk-significant. In addition, when modifications are 
considered, the importance values provide an indication of how much risk may be reduced 
by these modifications. 
4. Failure model 
The failure model of the TCDQ is a fault tree, of which the details are described in the 
following sections. The description is accompanied by a summary of the analyses necessary 
to obtain the model.  
Section 4.1 documents the models of the TCDQ failure scenarios along the LHC operation 
scenario. The analyses of the TCDQ in the identified scenarios are addressed in Section 4.2. 
Section 4.3 discusses the failure events. The data analysis and the resulting probabilities used 
to quantify the model are presented in Section 4.4 and failure dependencies and common 
cause failures are in Section 4.5. 
4.1. The failure scenario analysis 
The TCDQ receives the start signal and keeps adjusting its position with respect to the 
position and size of the beam. The operation mode is automatic servo (either tracking or 
holding position) by default. The TCDQ switches to remote mode for manual adjustments of 
position, which means tracking. The remote mode is inhibited at full energy but it may 
happen in injection and during the ramping (at a pause). In view of the above, failure 
scenarios of the TCDQ can be split into failure in position tracking (servo or remote) and 
failure in position holding. Errors in mode transitions are considered as well. Transition from 
remote to servo is more critical than servo to remote. The inappropriate servo mode leaves 
the TCDQ under control of the PLC, while the inappropriate remote leaves the TCDQ 
basically without control. 
A nominal operational scenario will consist of 9/10 fills in servo automatic mode and 1/10 in 
servo and remote mode [5]. For the fills in servo and remote mode, the fraction of time spent 
in remote is assumed to be equal to 2 hours,  
4.2. Analysis of function/system failures 
Fault tree analysis is the systematic, deductive analysis of the possible causes for the failure 
of functions and systems. The starting point for a fault tree analysis are the success criteria 
defined for the top event; these consider whether the system functions are within the 
specified/required range, at the time demanded.  
In terms of scope, the fault tree analysis considers: 
- the failure modes of the single system components 
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 - the availability of power (electrical, mechanical etc) and other support systems for the 
components of the system 
- the presence and correctness of actuation and control signals, considering the signal 
paths from logic to actuation elements 
- the correct generation and delivery of ILK signals 
- integrity of data during transmission, storage, and recall 
- the impact of errors during maintenance, testing, return to service, and system 
configuration 
- common cause failures of components within the system or in redundant trains of a 
system or issued by the same device. 
The fault trees lend themselves to be structured in other fault trees, which are made by other 
fault trees (called transfer gates), and so forth down to the decomposition into basic events. 
A basic event corresponds to the failure of a component. This the “atomic” block of the fault 
tree, in which data (e.g. probability, rates, and inspection interval) have to be filled.  
A fault tree analysis is performed for the TCDQ system functions, where the top event 
represents the probability the TCDQ is incorrectly positioned, leaving the LHC elements 
unprotected from an asynchronous beam dump. The construction of the fault tree follows a 
top-down approach. The definition of failure is at functional level, which makes it possible to 
model the failure logic ignoring the implementation details. This is the case of the several 
supervision functions in the CPU: they are separately modelled with their failure events in 
the fault tree, though they share the same CPU. This important dependency will appear at 
the lower component level, with the specification of basic failure events. 
Figure 6 shows the fault tree for the failure of TCDQ. The top event is the OR of two 
branches: 1) TCDQ failure in position tracking and 2) TCDQ failure in position holding. A 
third branch, which is in OR with the other two, accounts for the human error (manual 
adjustment) in entering set points or the failure to return operation back to servo. The 
operator error is a probability of failure on demand, with a demand rate represented by the 
event REMOTE MODE, equal to 1/10 fills. The TCDQ is in position tracking when the 
operator performs manual adjustments. The default case study assumes the operator can 
never fail, which is equivalent to remove contributions of branch three. At any time the 
TCDQ can be found in position tracking for a certain percentage of the total time and in 
position holding the rest of time. These figures are in TRACKING and HOLD event and are 
deduced from estimated operational experience [5]. 
The differences between the fault trees for position tracking and for holding are in the 
motors and the block. Motors and block are actuated elements and for this reason they 
cannot leave the position once they have been driven. For this reason, the branch of the 
position holding (TCDQ-SERVO-HOLD) is not affected by their failure.  
A detailed description of the fault trees with their scope is given in Appendix C, while failure 
events and failure data can be found in Appendix A and B respectively. 
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Figure 6: Fault tree of TCDQ failure 
4.3. Components and failure events 
The basic events representing component failures are identified starting from the point an 
output is produced or an action performed, (e.g. the generation of the output signal or the 
response of a final element) back to the sources and including the required support systems. 
For example, block or motors can fail by not responding to commands, or commands do not 
reach the motors or they are not correct when generated by the PLC control function. In the 
same way, ILK signals do not reach the BIC or they are not generated by the PLC interlock 
function. 
In total some 80 basic failure events have been identified. The name of a failure event is 
identified by a short identifier, which gives information on the component, the function and, 
if necessary, the signal generated. For example, PID-CONTROL-M1 is the failure of the CPU 
to calculate the CONTROL input to motor M1. 
There are failure modes that turn into a spurious generation of an ILK, then into a beam 
dump. They only affect the availability of the machine, and for this reason they are not 
modelled in the safety study. Among these there are: 
• errors in control signal generation that move the block into the beam line,  
• spurious ILK generated in the PLC supervision logic 
• power supply failure (fail safe) 
• break-short-false contacts (3-wires current loops in digital communications).  
Other failure modes are caught by duplication of signals and comparison (LVDT analogue 
and digital). They turn as well into a beam dump request and for this reason they are not 
accounted for in the model. 
Other simplifications concern the logic of failure: 
• the failure of the positioning of one motor leads to the failure of the TCDQ 
• the supervision of TCDQ operation by the operator is not credited 
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 All of these simplifications in the failure models are conservative. The complete list of failure 
events is given in Appendix A. 
4.4. Data analysis – estimation of event probabilities 
The level of description in this study is at assembly level and not at the level of components 
for which statistics of component failure rates exist or they can be deduced by reliability 
prediction methods. On lack of this specific information, values have been assigned on the 
basis of previous experience. In particular, failure data set of a previous LHC reliability 
study (Ref. [4]) has also driven the calculation of the failure data for the TCDQ, in addition to 
some conservative estimates.  
Failure rates are all assumed to be Lognormal distributed, with “error factor” equal to 10.  
For example, the mean value failure rate of a single output of an Analogue I/O output is 
1E-05/h (5th % is 3.75E-07, 95th % is 3.75E-05), while the mean value of the failure rate of the 
whole board is 1E-06/h (5th % is 3.75E-08, 95th % is 3.75E-06). The mean value of the failure 
rate of a power converter is assumed to be 1E-05/h. The mean value failure rate of 
communication (just the output frozen failure event) between two PLC and digital I/O 
board is 1E-06/h, while this is 1E-04/h if the communication is between the safety switch 
and the digital I/O. The latter is an example of conservative estimate of the failure rate when 
the information available is believed insufficient. The list of failure rates with statistics is 
given in Appendix B. 
Data for test and maintenance are defined in Ref. [3]. It is specified that the TCDQ undergoes 
calibration test at yearly frequency intervals. No special checks are foreseen for the TCDQ 
during LHC operation and no specific post mortem diagnostics exist. An implicit check on 
the TCDQ status is assumed between two fills, when the system has to move back to the 
initial position. This operation challenges almost all components, so it is considered a 
functional check of many TCDQ components, with the only exception of the ILK functions. 
Check frequency is every 10 hours, which is the assumed duration of a fill. 
4.5. Dependencies and common cause failures 
Dependencies are modelled in the fault tree of the TCDQ. A dependency exists when the 
failures of a set of components depend on the state of another component. For example, the 
failure of the electronic board implies the failure of all its outputs, which are also modelled 
as independent failure events.  
Common cause failures (CCF) are also modelled. A CCF deals with events or failure 
mechanisms that can cause failures in identical components of redundant systems 
simultaneously. A CCF is assigned to a group of components and several CCF groups have 
been identified in the TCDQ. The list of CCF groups is given in Appendix B.  
4.6. Quantification 
The analysis and quantification of the fault tree model of the TCDQ is done under the 
following assumptions: 
a) One year of operation of 400 fills, of which 40 are affected by manual adjustments 
b) 1 fill is 10 hours 
c) Manual adjustment lasts 2 hours 
d) Demand rate is 0.4 asynchronous beam dumps per beam, ref. [4] 
e) One fill is 2 hours and 15 min in position tracking and 7 hours 45 min in position 
holding 
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 The analysis of the model must return results in term of average probabilities, which are 
translated into a SIL figure. Insights on main contributors are also given as minimum cut sets 
and ranked by component importance. 
5. Results and insights 
5.1. Overview of results 
The fault tree model has been built by using the RISK Spectrum® Software, see Ref. [12].  
The tool returns the average probability of failure on demand of the TCDQ per year of LHC 
operation, 400 fills of 10 hours each, is 1.82 E-05 (5th percentile is 2.7 E-06, 95th percentile is 5.4 
E-04). This is 3.64 E-05 for two TCDQs. This figure is independent on the rate of 
asynchronous beam dumps. 
The figure corresponds to a SIL4 (within 1E-05 and 1E-04 probability of failure on demand, 
see Figure 4). The correctness of external data (e.g. inputs from MCS and timing system) and 
human errors are not included in the scope of the analysis. 
The predominant contributors to the TCDQs failure are: 
1) failure of the timing card to transmit start signal to the PLC (60.5%) 
2) failure of the PLC with both control and supervision functions (27.5%) 
3) failure of the ETHERNET board to transmit correct set points to the PLC (6.0%) 
The sets of contributors occur either in position tracking or holding. They are single points of 
failure of the TCDQ. The other contributors in the control function, motor drive electronics, 
mechanics etc. are less significant because of internal supervision. Their overall contribution 
is about 6.0% and individually less than 0.6%, which is a confirmation of the effectiveness of 
TCDQ supervision during LHC operation.   
5.2. Cut sets (failure combinations) and vulnerabilities 
Minimal Cut Sets (MCS) are groups of basic events whose occurrence causes the top event of 
a fault tree to occur. Each MCS represents a specific failure scenario leading to the failure of 
the TCDQ. The sum of all MCS returns the probability of the fault tree top event.  
Minimal cut sets all lead to the same consequences, though they represent different failure 
scenarios. The dominant (most important) minimal cut sets are shown in Table 2. Four 
minimal cut sets are about 94.0% of the total probability. The remaining contributors sum to 
6.0 % of the total probability and are individually less than 0.6 %. The highest contributors 
are 3 singletons (single points of failure). The description of the most important minimal cut 
sets follows. 
5.2.1 Minimal Cut Set No. 1: PLC-TIMING-CARD 
The largest contribution (with 60.5% of the probability of TCDQ failure) is the PLC-TIMING-
CARD failure event, when the TCDQ is in position tracking. The failure scenario 
corresponds to the failure of the timing card to communicate the start signal to the PLC, as 
received from the timing system. In other words, the timing card acknowledges the reception 
of the timing signal to the timing system, but fails to deliver the same signal to the PLC that, 
for this reason does not track the beam position, leaving LHC unprotected. This failure can 
only be discovered at the end of the fill. 
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 5.2.2 Minimal Cut Set No. 2 and 3: PLC-CPU-SW 
This failure event contributes with 27.5% of the probability of TCDQ failure. It occurs when 
the PLC CPU fails both with control and supervision, either in position tracking or holding. 
The PLC runs without changing control inputs to the motors, and this is not detected by the 
supervision functions. On the basis of available documentation, this failure has been 
assumed to be undetectable during the LHC operation, while it is discovered at the rearming 
of TCDQ before next fill.  
5.2.3 Minimal Cut Set No. 4: ETHERNET-BOARD 
This failure event contributes with 6.0% of the probability of TCDQ failure. It occurs when 
the Ethernet board fails to transmit the correct set points to the PLC, as received from the 
MCS. On the basis of the available documentation, this failure has been assumed to be 
undetectable during the LHC operation, while it is discovered at the rearming of the TCDQ 
before next fill. The read back of MCS tables is assumed to be ineffective if the failure is such 
to compare the same incorrect set of data. 
Table 2: Minimal Cut Sets of the TCDQ 
#     Prob.        %    Failure events                                  TCDQ configuration 
1     1.100E-005  60.5  PLC-TIMING-CARD                                 TRACKING             
2     3.900E-006  21.5  PLC-CPU-SW                                      HOLD 
3     1.100E-006   6.1  PLC-CPU-SW                                      TRACKING             
4     1.100E-006   6.1  ETHERNET-BOARD                                  TRACKING             
5     1.100E-007   0.6  BLOCK FAILURE         PLC-ILK-BLOCKER-SW        TRACKING 
6     9.900E-008   0.5  NO-CAL-MOTOR          PLC-ILK-CAL-FILE-SW       TRACKING 
7     8.910E-008   0.5  DC-MOTOR2-CAL         PLC-ILK-POS-THR2-SW       TRACKING      
8     8.910E-008   0.5  DC-MOTOR1-CAL         PLC-ILK-POS-THR1-SW       TRACKING  
9     3.900E-008   0.2  AIO-CTR-MD2           PLC-ILK-POS-THR2-SW       HOLD 
10    3.900E-008   0.2  PLC-ILK-POS-THR1-SW   TX-AIO-MD1                HOLD 
11    3.900E-008   0.2  MD1-SPURIOUS          PLC-ILK-POS-THR1-SW       HOLD 
12    3.900E-008   0.2  PID-CONTROL-M2        PLC-ILK-POS-THR2-SW       HOLD 
13    3.900E-008   0.2  PID-CONTROL-M1        PLC-ILK-POS-THR1-SW       HOLD 
14    3.900E-008   0.2  PLC-ILK-POS-THR2-SW   TX-PLC-AIO-MD2            HOLD 
15    3.900E-008   0.2  MD2-SPURIOUS          PLC-ILK-POS-THR2-SW       HOLD   
16    3.900E-008   0.2  PLC-ILK-POS-THR2-SW   TX-AIO-MD2                HOLD                   
17    3.900E-008   0.2  AIO-CTR-MD1           PLC-ILK-POS-THR1-SW       HOLD                 
18    3.900E-008   0.2  PLC-ILK-POS-THR1-SW   TX-PLC-AIO-MD1            HOLD                   
19    1.100E-008   0.1  MD1                   PLC-ILK-POS-THR1-SW       TRACKING 
20    1.100E-008   0.1  MD2-380PS             PLC-ILK-MD2-SW            TRACKING 
21    1.100E-008   0.1  PLC-ILK-POS-THR2-SW   TX-MD2-MOTOR2             TRACKING             
22    1.100E-008   0.1  PID-CONTROL-M2        PLC-ILK-POS-THR2-SW       TRACKING   
23    1.100E-008   0.1  DC-MOTOR2             PLC-ILK-POS-THR2-SW       TRACKING     
24    1.100E-008   0.1  MD2-SPURIOUS          PLC-ILK-POS-THR2-SW       TRACKING             
25    1.100E-008   0.1  PLC-ILK-POS-THR1-SW   TX-PLC-AIO-MD1            TRACKING             
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 Other minimal cut sets take a smaller contribution, individually less than 0.6%. They are 
undetected failure events. Among these, there is the undetected failure of the block (not 
moving anymore) the undetected failure of the motors and their power converters (MD), the 
undetected error in communications and the undetected incorrect calibration files. The 
possibility of undetected inappropriate switching from servo to remote (SWITCH-REMOTE-
PLC) is also accounted for in the model, though it is very low in term of probability. Due to 
their very low contribution, these failure scenarios are not discussed in detail.  
It is worth remarking that this set of contributors does not include failure scenarios which 
develop outside the TCDQ and may jeopardize the functioning (e.g. MCS incorrect set 
points, missed start signal, and human error in calculating position settings).  
The importance results in term of failure events and model parameters are further discussed 
in the next Section 5.3. 
5.3. Importance results 
Table 3 shows the most important basic failure events ranked in term of Fussell-Vesely 
importance (FV) values for the TCDQ unavailability figures. The FV measures the relative 
contribution of a basic failure event to the overall accident frequency, i.e. the system failure 
probability without the failure event divided by the system failure probability with the 
failure event, see also [7]. The higher is the FV the bigger the expected contribution. 
Results confirm the importance of PLC-TIMING-CARD, the Ethernet board and the 
complete failure of the CPU both in controls and supervision. They also show that the TCDQ 
is more prone to fail while tracking than holding. Software interlocks of position thresholds 
also come up into the top rank.  
 
Table 3: Importance results 
#    Failure event         Prob.       FV 
 
1    TRACKING              2.200E-001  7.620E-001  
  
2    PLC-TIMING-CARD       5.000E-005  6.052E-001 
  
3    PLC-CPU-SW            5.000E-006  2.751E-001   
 
4    HOLD                  7.800E-001  2.380E-001   
 
5    ETHERNET-BOARD        5.000E-006  6.063E-002   
 
6    PLC-ILK-POS-THR1-SW   1.000E-003  2.159E-002   
 
7    PLC-ILK-POS-THR2-SW   1.000E-003  2.158E-002   
 
8    BLOCK FAILURE         4.998E-004  6.114E-003   
 
9    PLC-ILK-BLOCKER-SW    1.000E-003  6.050E-003   
 
10   NO-CAL-MOTOR          4.500E-004  5.504E-003   
 
11   PLC-ILK-CAL-FILE-SW   1.000E-003  5.447E-003   
 
12   DC-MOTOR2-CAL         4.050E-004  5.076E-003   
 
13   DC-MOTOR1-CAL         4.050E-004  5.076E-003   
 
14   MASKING-ON            4.200E-003  4.200E-003 
 
15   MD1-SPURIOUS          5.000E-005  2.859E-003   
 
16   MD2-SPURIOUS          5.000E-005  2.859E-003  
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Table 4 shows the parameters ranked by importance, where the importance measure is the 
sensitivity. The assumed implicit check of the control function (every 10 hours after the fill) is 
the most important parameter. Indeed, as it has been already remarked, the TCDQ is 
supervised during operation and has neither redundant parts nor post mortem diagnostics. 
 
Table 4: Parameters ranked by importance (sensitivity) 
#    Parameter           Ti,p,r      Value        Sensitivity 
 
1    CONTROL FUNCTION      Ti        1.000E+001   8.079E+001 
 
2    GENERIC-HW            r         1.000E-005   1.415E+001 
 
3    TRACKING              q         2.200E-001   1.178E+001 
 
4    CPU-SW                r         1.000E-006   4.619E+000 
 
5    ETHERNET              r         1.000E-006   1.637E+000 
 
6    ILK-SW                q         1.000E-003   1.598E+000 
 
7    HOLD POSITION         q         7.800E-001   1.358E+000 
 
8    CAL-FILE              q         4.500E-004   1.169E+000 
 
9    MD-FAILURE            r         1.000E-005   1.069E+000 
 
10   BLOCKER               r         1.000E-004   1.061E+000 
 
11   ANALOGUE-OUT          r         1.000E-005   1.057E+000 
 
12   PID-FAILURE           r         1.000E-005   1.057E+000 
 
13   TX-CPU-ANALOGUE       r         1.000E-005   1.057E+000 
 
14   TX-ANALOGUE-MD        r         1.000E-005   1.057E+000 
 
15   MOTOR-BLOCKER         Ti        1.000E+001   1.051E+000 
 
 
5.4. Sensitivity analyses: operation, failure data and human error 
The TCDQ depends on the correctness of information received from other systems, like the 
position settings, the start signal, the calibration files and the PID parameters. It also strongly 
depends on the human error during the adjustment of position settings. These are single 
points of failure and cannot be discovered by the TCDQ in the present configuration.  
This section presents a few analyses, which demonstrate the sensitivity of the TCDQ to the 
operation scenario, the failure data and the human error.  
The sensitivity analysis deals with the operational scenario. In the default scenario, this is 
assumed to be made of tracking and holding, with the tracking phase being the most critical 
for the TCDQ. In this sensitivity analysis, the TCDQ is assumed to be always in tracking 
configuration. The resulting probability of failure on demand of two TCDQ systems is 1.2 E-
04, which is SIL3.  
The second sensitivity analysis considers a failure data set which is higher by a factor of 10. 
The resulting probability of failure on demand of two TCDQ systems is 3.6 E-04, which is 
SIL3.  
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 The sensitivity analysis to the human error is done considering a human error probability 
equal to 0.01. The TCDQ probability of failure on demand is 2E-03, which is SIl2. Justification 
about the assumed figure follows. 
5.4.1 Sensitivity to human error: justification and insights 
A Human Reliability Analysis in which the human-machine interface, procedures, and 
technical features associated with manual adjustments is included has not been performed. 
A failure event occurs when the operator fails to adjust the position of the TCDQ in remote 
mode. This failure scenario is very sensitive to the human error probability. 
In this respect, the following assumptions are made: 
• Manual adjustments are performed in 1 of 10 fills, or 40 times a year based on the 
assumed 400 fills per year. 
• A manual misconfiguration of the TCDQ always leaves the TCDQ unavailable to 
protect the LHC in the event of an asynchronous beam dump. 
• Multiple adjustments may be performed in a fill that includes a manual adjustment 
and adjustments are made to both TCDQ motors. In this sensitivity analysis, all 
adjustments are viewed as a single operation. 
The causes of manual misconfiguration may include both “cognitive” errors (incorrect values 
used in a calculation) and execution “slips” in reading, recall, or manual input: 
- miscalculation of the desired TCDQ settings 
- error in look-up from a table of previously calculated TCDQ settings 
- error in recall of desired settings following look-up 
- error in manual input, e.g. a “slip” 
Table 5 lists some values from the literature that may be used as a reference. Based on these, 
0.01 is selected as a “best” value for the human error probability. This value does not 
consider factors that could be identified in a detailed analysis of the task, ergonomics, and 
performance conditions, which could support a lower value.  
To justify values of P(misconfiguration /adjustment) below 0.01, a brief task analysis would 
examine: 
- the manner in which the desired manual settings are determined and whether they are 
calculated during the manual adjustment or previously 
- the information used by the operators to determine the desired settings 
- how the desired settings are entered (absolute settings, absolute change, percent change, 
similarity of values for motor 1 and motor 2, scale for motor 1 and motor 2 settings) 
- how the operator may perceive the overall system response to the new settings and 
whether the new settings have the desired effect 
- the “aids” (tables, etc.) that would support the operators in determining whether the 
desired settings are reasonable 
- the technical features of the interface that a) could indicate to the operators how the desired 
settings compare to the previous values set by the MCS for the given LHC state or energy 
(i.e. current values before the adjustment), b) provide automatic “sanity checks” for the 
entered settings, or c) could provide limit values (e.g. one-sided) on the input settings. 
- how the settings are independently checked and/or confirmed 
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 It can be seen that a number of technical, procedural, aids and administrative features may 
improve the reliability of manual adjustments. Nevertheless, the error probability of 0.01 
corresponds to somewhat less than 1 error for every two years of operation (assuming a total 
of 40 fills with manual adjustments per year). This may be viewed as a fairly realistic value if 
there are few opportunities to effectively practice the task. In any case, justifying an error 
probability at 0.001 or lower will be difficult, even if aids and technical features are provided, 
given the non-routine character of the task. On the other hand, if the fills involving manual 
adjustments of TCDQ actually include a series of manual adjustments, the number of 
opportunities for errors could increase significantly. 
Table 5: Methods of HEP and HEP figures 
Source Description Value 
THERP [8] Initial-screening model Table 20-2 
Failure to perform rule-based action correctly when written 
procedures are available and used, after diagnosis 
(1) Errors per critical step without recovery factors 
0.05 (EF = 10) 
Initial-screening model Table 20-2 
(2) Errors per critical step with recovery factors 
0.025 (EF = 10) 
NARA [9] Generic Task Type A2 Start or reconfigure a system from the Main 
Control Room following procedures, with feedback. 
This would apply if the procedure were to indicate the TCDQ 
settings to apply. However, it is assumed the staff are determining 
the TCDQ manual settings on a case-by-case basis, using their 
experience. TCDQ manual adjustments cannot be considered 
routine. 
1E-3 
Kirwan [10] Human Performance Limiting Values 
Single operator carrying out task(s), less than optimum ergonomics 
This is not an estimate but a lower bound for individual 
performance, representing the error rate under the best possible 
conditions. 
1E-3 
ATHEANA [11] Suggested calibration points for experts (nuclear power plant tasks) 
The operator(s) would “Infrequently” fail.  
The level of difficulty is moderately high, such that we should see an 
occasional failure if all of the crews/operators were to experience 
this scenario. 
~ 0.1 
The operator(s) is “Unlikely” to fail.  
The level of difficulty is quite low and we should not see any 
failures if all the crews/operators were to experience this scenario. 
~ 0.01 
The operator(s) is “Extremely Unlikely” to fail. 
This desired action is so easy that it is almost inconceivable that any 




5.5. Results and SIL 
The assessment of residual risk comes from the combination of the probability of failure of 
the TCDQ multiplied by the frequency of the asynchronous beam dump per year. The 
overall estimate probability of TCDQ failure is 3.64E-05 which corresponds to a safety level 
of SIL4. According to the IEC 61508 standard, the calculated SIL4 is adequate to reduce the 
risk of damaging LHC elements in case of an asynchronous beam dump for both beams, at 
that rate (0.8/year) and for the assumes consequences (catastrophic).  
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 The result is very sensitive to model assumptions, the failure data and the human error if the 
operator is included in the control loop. Figure 7 shows the result for the TCDQ in the 
default case study and the results from sensitivity analysis. The worst SIL is obtained when 
human error is accounted for in the model.  
It is important to remark that results have been obtained under some conservative and some 
optimistic assumptions. In particular: 
• Misconfiguration of the TCDQ, either small or big, always leads to failure 
• Asynchronous beam dumps are those generated in the LBDS only  
• Rearming cover diagnostics of system components, which are recovered to an as-
good-as-new state at every new fill. 
The first assumption is conservative, while the second and third assumptions are optimistic. 
The number of asynchronous beam dumps could also impact on the choice of the SIL table. 
A number of asynchronous beam dumps equal or higher than 10 per year would suggest the 

















Figure 7: Sensitivity analyses of TCDQ PFD versus operation scenario, failure data and HEP. 
5.6. Main insights and modifications based on the results 
The safety study of the TCDQ systems returns a low residual risk for the TCDQ failure in 
case of an asynchronous beam dump. The safety level is SIL4. 
The identified system vulnerabilities, the three single points of failure in particular, can be 
addressed by the following design modifications: 
• TCDQ failure of the PLC timing card that receives the start signal: acknowledge the 
start signal from the PLC which attests the PLC entered the ramping phase. 
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 • TCDQ CPU complete failure at the application level (control functions and 
supervision functions): make sure this failure is caught by some interlock or 
implement controls and supervision in two separated PLC. 
• TCDQ Ethernet board: make sure incorrect set points transmitted to PLC can be 
detected in the same PLC 
• TCDQ interlock generated by supervision function: check of interlock functionality at 
regular interval. 
• Human error: limiting the modification that the operator may apply by a manual 
adjustment of position 
Among the modifications, the physical separation of control functions and supervision is 
also recommended in the design of safety critical systems.  
The impact of human error on TCDQ operation calls for the analysis of the adjustment tasks, 
procedures and performance conditions in order to identify defences currently in place and 
possible improvements.  
6. Conclusions and outlook 
6.1. Outcome 
Based on the IEC 61508 standard, the estimated risk of not protecting the LHC from an 
asynchronous beam dump, (0.8 per year and catastrophic), leads to the requirement that the 
TCDQ must meet SIL4.  
The analysis has calculated the probability of failure on demand of the TCDQ, while it does 
not review the SIL-related requirements on design, maintenance and operation of the system. 
The result for an assumed default operation scenario, 400 fills, 20% of the time in position 
tracking and 80% in position holding, is estimated to be 3.64E-5 for the two TCDQs (one per 
beam). Two major assumptions underlying this value are: 
• MCS and timing system inputs to TCDQ are correct 
• The system is operated only in servo (automatic) mode with no manual adjustment of 
TCDQ position 
With these assumptions the TCDQs satisfy SIL4. 
The TCDQ is designed to cope with the majority of internal failure events, and many of those 
which are not covered can be discovered in between two consecutive LHC fills. Still, three 
dominant contributions to TCDQ unavailability are identified: 
1. Failure of the PLC timing card to transmit the start signal to the PLC. 
2. Failure of the PLC CPU to provide position controls and supervision. 
3. Failure of the Ethernet to transmit set points to the PLC. 
The three dominant contributions appear to be single points of failure, based on the 
provided documentation. 
A vulnerability to human error exists, if the operator is included in the control of the TCDQ. 
A list of recommendations has been provided to address and possibly remove the identified 
vulnerabilities, and obtain a further risk reduction. 
 22 [2009-03] 
 6.2. On-going and future work 
In future work, the scope of the TCDQ study can be broadened in order to include those 
parts that were not credited in the analysis. In particular, this may include the generation of 
the start signal, the correctness of the set-points in the MCS, and the contribution of the 
human error to the overall risk. The impact of human error is suggested to be the first issue 
to address due to the dominant contribution in worsening the SIL figure.  
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 Appendix A: Failure basic events 
Basic failure events are either referring to the output of the component (when an output is 
not generated) or to the result of action which is the case of a final element that has to stop 
the beam. 
The failure rate model types applied to the Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) basic failure 
event are those available in the Risk Spectrum® PRA. The complete list includes: 
• MR: monitored, repairable component 
• PT: periodically tested component 
• PD: component with constant probability per demand 
• CM: component with constant mission time 
• FR: component characterised by occurrence frequency (used for initiating events) 
• NR: non-repairable component. 
 
Taking into account the characteristics of the TCDQ operation, two model types are used; the 
PT and the PD. The PT model uses the failure rate of the component with the inspection/test 
interval. The PD model uses the probability to fail on demand, which is independent on the 
assumed inspection/test interval. Probabilities and rates have been deduced by previous 
analysis on LHC system, see Ref. [4]. Due to the fact description is at functional level and not 
at component level, the failure modes are apportioned to the assemblies instead of 
components.  
The list of basic failure events is shown in Table 6, accompanied with a short description and 
the applied model (failure rate or probability on demand). Symbols that represent failure 
events in Risk Spectrum are 1) circles for basic failure events which do not need any further 
decomposition, and 2) diamonds for failure events that might be further decomposed. The 
latter failure events are given more conservative failure rates.  
MAN-POS-ERROR and REMOTE-NO-RELEASED, which belong to the human error during 
manual adjustment of TCDQ position, are also included. These two failure events have been 
considered in the sensitivity analysis of subsection 5.4. 
Table 6: failure events 
ID Description Model 
AIO-CPU-POSM1 Failure of Analogue I/O output feedback signal from 
potentiometer at motor 1 to CPU 
Rate 
AIO-CPU-POSM2 Failure of Analogue I/O output  feedback signal from 
potentiometer at motor 2 to CPU 
Rate 
AIO-CTR-MD1 The control signal CTR-MD1 is not generated at the output of 
the Analogue I/O board 
Rate 
AIO-CTR-MD2 The control signal CTR-MD2 is not generated at the output of 
the Analogue I/O board 
Rate 
DC-MOTOR1 Breakdown of DC motor 1 Rate 
DC-MOTOR1-CAL Incorrect calibration of motor 1 Probability 
DC-MOTOR2 Breakdown of DC motor 2 Rate 
DC-MOTOR2-CAL Incorrect calibration of motor 2 Probability 
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 DIO-BIC-ILK1 ILK1 to BIC stuck at OK at the digital I/O output Probability 
DIO-BIC-ILK2 ILK2 to BIC stuck at OK at the digital I/O output Rate 
DIO-BOARD Failure of the digital I/O board with all outputs stuck at Rate 
ENDSTOP-OUT-M1 Motor 1 blocked in end stop out position (16.5 mm) Rate 
ENDSTOP-OUT-M2 Motor 2 blocked in end stop out position (16.5mm) Rate 
ENDSTOP-SWITCH-M1 Failure of switch of motor 1 end stop out stuck at open 
(signal is stuck at OK) 
Probability 
ENDSTOP-SWITCH-M2 Failure of switch of motor 2 end stop out stuck at open 
(signal is stuck at OK) 
Probability 
ETHERNET-BOARD Failure of the PLC Ethernet board Rate 
ETHERNET-SETPOINTS Failure of Ethernet to transmit set points to CPU Rate 
ETHERNET-WD Failure of the Ethernet watch dog Rate 
MASKING-ON The position threshold are inappropriately masked on Probability 
MD1 Breakdown of PARVEX MD1 (electronics) Rate 
MD1-380PS Failure of the PARVEX MD1 power converter Rate 
MD2 Breakdown of PARVEX MD2 (electronics) Rate 
MD2-380PS Failure of PARVEX MD2 power converter Rate 
NO-CAL-MOTOR Missed calibration file for motors Probability 
PID-CONTROL-M1 Failure of the PID (SW) to calculate the control input to 
motor 1 
Rate 
PID-CONTROL-M2 Failure of the PID (SW) to calculate the control input to 
motor 2 
Rate 
PID-PARAMETERS PID parameters are incorrect Probability 
MAN-POS-ERROR PID set points are not correct for motor 2 as provided by the 
operator in the control room 
Probability 
PID-SETPOINTS-MISS Set points and thresholds are not loaded in the PID Probability 
PID-THR1 Incorrect thresholds for position motor 1 Probability 
PID-THR2 Incorrect thresholds for position motor 2 Probability 
PLC-BUS-AIO Failure of BUS-interface between CPU and PLC analogue 
I/O board 
Rate 
PLC-BUS-DIO Failure of BUS-interface between CPU and PLC digital I/O 
board 
Rate 
PLC-CLOCK Failure of PLC clock Rate 
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 PLC-ILK-AIO-ADC-SW Failure of SW to generate ILK in case of error in the PLC 
ADC converter 
Rate 
PLC-ILK-BLOCK-SW Failure of SW to generate the ILK in case of no displacement 
of the TCDQ block 
Rate 
PLC-ILK-BUS-INTER-SW Failure of SW to generate the ILK in case of PLC BUS failure Rate 
PLC-ILK-CAL-FILE-SW Failure of SW to generate ILK in case of absence of 
calibration file of DC motors 
Rate 
PLC-ILK-CPU-CLOCK-SW Failure of SW to generate ILK in case of failure of PLC CPU 
clock 
Rate 
PLC-ILKENDSTOP-M1-SW Failure of software to generate the ILK in case of end stop out 
position is reached by motor 1 
Rate 
PLC-ILKENDSTOP-M2-SW Failure of software to generate the ILK in case of end stop out 
position is reached by motor 2 
Rate 
PLC-ILK-LVDT-POT1-SW Failure of the SW to generate ILK in case of disagreement 
between LVDT and potentiometer pos of motor1 
Rate 
PLC-ILK-LVDT-POT2-SW Failure of the SW to generate ILK in case of disagreement 
between LVDT and potentiometer pos of motor2 
Rate 
PLC-ILK-MD1-SW Failure of SW to detect the failure of the MD1 PARVEX 
power converter 
Rate 
PLC-ILK-MD2-SW Failure of SW to detect the failure of the MD2 PARVEX 
power converter 
Rate 
PLC-ILK-MODE-SW Failure of SW to generate the ILK in case of incorrect mode of 
operation 
Rate 
PLC-ILK-PID-FILE-SW Failure of SW to generate the ILK in case the PID setting file 
is not loaded 
Rate 
PLC-ILK-POS-THR1-SW Failure of SW to generate the ILK in case the threshold 
position of motor 1 is exceeded 
Rate 
PLC-ILK-POS-THR2-SW Failure of SW to generate the ILK in case the position 
threshold of motor 2 is exceeded 
Rate 
PLC-ILK-RACK-SW Failure of SW to generate ILK in case of failure of the PLC 
rack 
Rate 
PLC-RACK Failure of the PLC rack Rate 
PLC-TIMING Failure of the PLC timing card Rate 
POT-M1 Failure of potentiometer to calculate the position of motor 1 Rate 
POT-M2 Failure of potentiometer to calculate the position of motor 2 Rate 
REMOTE-NO-RELEASED The operator fails to return control mode into servo Probability 
SWITCH-REMOTE-PLC The PLC switches to REMOTE mode Probability 
TIMING-START Failure of timing system to send start signal to PLC  Rate 
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 TX-AIO-CPU-POSM1 Failure of transmitting the motor 1 position feedback from 
the analogue I/O board to the PLC CPU 
Probability 
TX-AIO-CPU-POSM2 Failure of transmitting the motor 2 position feedback from 
the analogue I/O board to the PLC CPU 
Probability 
TX-AIO-MD1 TX failure of CTR-MD1 signal from Analogue I/O board to 
Motor drive 1 
Probability 
TX-AIO-MD2 TX failure of CTR-MD2 signal from Analogue I/O board to 
Motor drive 2 
Probability 
TX-DIO-BIC1 TX failure of TCDQ ILK signal 1stuck at OK at the BIC input Probability 
TX-DIO-BIC2 TX failure of TCDQ ILK signal 2 stuck at OK at the BIC input Probability 
TX-ENDSTOPM1-DIO Failure of transmission between end stop safety switch and 
digital I/O board, signal stuck at OK 
Probability 
TX-ENDSTOPM2-DIO Failure of transmission from end stop switch motor2 to 
digital I/O, signal stuck at OK 
Probability 
TX-MD1-MOTOR1 Failure in the cabling between motor drive 1 and motor 1 Probability 
TX-MD2-MOTOR2 Failure in the cabling between motor drive 1 and motor 1 Probability 
TX-PLC-AIO-MD1 TX failure of CTR-MD1 signal from PLC (control function) to 
the Analogue I/O board 
Probability 
TX-PLC-AIO-MD2 TX failure of CTR-MD2 signal from PLC (control function) to 
the Analogue I/O board 
Probability 
TX-POTM1-AIO Failure of transmission of position feedback motor 1 from 
potentiometer to Analogue I/O board 
Probability 
TX-POTM2-AIO Failure of transmission of position feedback motor 2 from 
potentiometer to Analogue I/O  
Probability 
 27 [2009-03] 
 Appendix B: Failure data 
This appendix presents the failure data for basic failure events and CCF used for the safety 
analysis. 
Failure rates 
Failure rates are collected from literature. Most popular databases are the Military Handbook 
217F, the IEC TR 62380 and the SINTEF reliability prediction method for safety instrumented 
systems. They all provide reliability models, which calculate the statistics on the component 
failure rate with respect to several parameters (temperature, operating conditions, etc). In the 
case studied, by sake of simplicity, some approximations are made to get a conservative 
estimate of the failure rate. In TCDQ, failure events mainly refer to assemblies, instead of 
components, so statistics are not directly available neither they can be easily deduced 
without the support of more detailed documentation. Results from previous LHC reliability 
studies have also been used to a certain extent [4] and certain failure rates have been slightly 
overestimated. It is important to remark that the failure rate values are used in combination 
with the assumed functional test of the TCDQ before the re-arming. 
Table 7 shows the list of failure rates per hour. Each quantity is lognormal distributed, with 
the mean value, 5th and 95th percentiles corresponding to an error factor 10. Specific failure 
rates are: electronics boards are 1E-06/h, power converters are 1E-05/h, mechanics are 1E-
04/h, short communications are 1E-06/h, long communications are 1E-05/h, errors in the 
PID reference files are all 1E-05/h, and so on. Some of the failure rates (mainly digital 
boards) correspond to a precise failure mode, which is specified in the description field. 
Other failure rates (mainly analogue boards) are more general. 
Table 7: Failure rates 
ID Description Mean Dist.type Median 5th perc. 95th perc. 
ANALOGUE-
BOARD 
Failure of the 
analogue board 
1.00E-06 Lognormal 3.75E-07 3.75E-08 3.75E-06 
ANALOGUE-OUT Failure of analogue 
board output (stuck 
at) 
1.00E-05 Lognormal 3.75E-06 3.75E-07 3.75E-05 
BLOCK Failure of the block to 
move 
1.00E-04 Lognormal 3.75E-05 3.75E-06 3.75E-04 
DC-MOTOR Failure of the DC 
motor to move 
1.00E-05 Lognormal 3.75E-06 3.75E-07 3.75E-05 
DIGITAL-BOARD Failure of the digital 
board (stuck at) 
1.00E-06 Lognormal 3.75E-07 3.75E-08 3.75E-06 
DIGITAL-OUT Failure of a digital 
board output stuck at 
1.00E-06 Lognormal 3.75E-07 3.75E-08 3.75E-06 




1.00E-06 Lognormal 3.75E-07 3.75E-08 3.75E-06 
GENERIC-HW Failure of generic HW 
component 
1.00E-05 Lognormal 3.75E-06 3.75E-07 3.75E-05 
LVDT Failure of LVDT and 
PML 1000 and Power 
supply 
1.00E-05 Lognormal 3.75E-06 3.75E-07 3.75E-05 
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 MD-FAILURE Failure  of motor 
drive power converter 
1.00E-05 Lognormal 3.75E-06 3.75E-07 3.75E-05 
MD-MOTOR Motor drive failure 
(internal) to drive 
motor 
1.00E-05 Lognormal 3.75E-06 3.75E-07 3.75E-05 
MOTOR-STUCK Motor stuck at the end 
switch position 
1.00E-04 Lognormal 3.75E-05 3.75E-06 3.75E-04 
PID-FAILURE Failure of PID to 
generate the correct 
control signal 
1.00E-05 Lognormal 3.75E-06 3.75E-07 3.75E-05 
PID-PAR-ERROR Error in the 
calculation of PID 
parameters 
1.00E-05 Lognormal 3.75E-06 3.75E-07 3.75E-05 
PLC-BUS Failure of internal bus 1.00E-06 Lognormal 3.75E-07 3.75E-08 3.75E-06 
PLC-CLOCK PLC clock failure 1.00E-06 Lognormal 3.75E-07 3.75E-08 3.75E-06 
PLC-RACK Failure of the PLC 
rack 
1.00E-06 Lognormal 3.75E-07 3.75E-08 3.75E-06 
POTENTIOMETER Failure of 
potentiometer to 
measure position 
1.00E-05 Lognormal 3.75E-06 3.75E-07 3.75E-05 
SETPOINT-ERROR Error in the 
calculation of set 
points for PID 
1.00E-05 Lognormal 3.75E-06 3.75E-07 3.75E-05 
SPURIOUS-
MODE-SWITCH 
Spurious HW failure: 
TCDQ mode  is 
changed 
inappropriately 




from analogue board 
to PLC CPU 




analogue board to 
motor drive 




CPU to analogue IO 
board 
1.00E-05 Lognormal 3.75E-06 3.75E-07 3.75E-05 
TX-CPU-DIGITAL Transmission failure 
CPU to digital IO 
board 
1.00E-06 Lognormal 3.75E-07 3.75E-08 3.75E-06 
TX-DIGITAL-BIC Transmission failure 
from digital IO board 
to BIC 
1.00E-05 Lognormal 3.75E-06 3.75E-07 3.75E-05 
TX-MD-MOTOR Transmission failure 
motor drive to motor 





analogue IO board 




of the start signal  
1.00E-05 Lognormal 3.75E-06 3.75E-07 3.75E-05 
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Probabilities on demand 
The list of probabilities on demand in the TCDQ model is shown in Table 8. Again, the 
sample distribution is the Lognormal with 10 as error factor. The failure events with a 
probability on demand occur when the component is challenged to perform an action just at 
the time this is demanded. These failure events do not depend on the time between two 
demands, and because of that they are considered constant probabilities. When applicable, 
the model of calculation is an average probability = λT/2, where λ is the failure rate and T is 
the mission time, 4000 hours. For example, on lack of periodical checks, the software that 
implement the supervision function and trigger ILK can be assumed to fail with a rate of 1E-
06/h, which multiplied by 4000/2 = 2000 h makes 2E-03. Some probabilities are multiplied 
by a factor 4.5 and this is done to compensate the fact they are multiplied by 0.22 in the 
tracking branch, the figure that takes into account the fraction of time spent in tracking 
configuration.  
Table 8: Probabilities on demand 
ID Description Mean Dist.type Median 5th perc. 95th perc. 
CAL-FILE Probability of 
making a bad 
calibration 
1.00E-04 Lognormal 3.75E-05 3.75E-06 3.75E-04 
ELECTR-ON-
DEMAND 




1.00E-04 Lognormal 3.75E-05 3.75E-06 3.75E-04 
END-SWITCH Failure of end 
switches 
4.50E-04 Lognormal 3.75E-05 3.75E-06 3.75E-04 
ILK-SW Probability the ILK 
function does not 
issue the ILK 
1.00E-03 Lognormal 3.75E-04 3.75E-05 3.75E-03 
OP-ERROR Human error 
affecting TCDQ 
control function 
1.00E-02 Lognormal 3.75E-03 3.75E-04 3.75E-02 
PID-PARAM PID parameters are 
incorrect 
1.00E-05 Lognormal 3.75E-06 3.75E-07 3.75E-05 
POS-SET-
INCORRECT 
Probability of having 
incorrect settings 




settings are missed 
4.50E-05 Lognormal 3.75E-06 3.75E-07 3.75E-05 
TX-NOTESTED TX which are not 
tested, or challenged 
at every fill 
1.00E-04 Lognormal 3.75E-05 3.75E-06 3.75E-04 
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 Other data 
Other data for the analysis are the fractions of time the system spends in tracking position, 
holding position and the fraction of fills that are affected by manual adjustments. They are 
shown in Table 9. 
 
Table 9: Fraction of time used to model contributions from tracking and hold branches and human error 
ID Description Mean Dist.type Median 5th perc. 95th perc. 
HOLDING Probability the 
system is in servo 
mode 




system is in remote 
mode 
1.00E-01 None 1.00E-01 1.00E-01 1.00E-01 
TRACKING Probability the 
system is in servo 
mode 
2.2E-01 None 2.2E-01 2.2E-01 2.2E-01 
 
Common cause failures 
All CCFs are modelled with a beta factor, which is assumed to be 0.1 for all CCF sets. This 
value is bigger with respect to the suggested value that one can find in reference manual 
used to assess risk for safety critical systems, for example the SINTEF (Reliability Prediction 
Method). It is important not to confuse CCF with dependencies. CCFs are only failure modes 
that affect at the same time two or more trains of redundancy. The list of CCF sets 
accompanied by a short description is shown in Table 10.  
 
Table 10: CCF sets 
ID Description CCF model Failure events 
BUS-IO CCF of BUS to I/O 
communications 
Beta factor PLC-BUS-AIO 
PLC-BUS-DIO 
CAL-FILE CCF in calibration file Beta factor DC-MOTOR1-CAL 
DC-MOTOR2-CAL 
DIGITAL CCF of digital board 
outputs 
Beta factor DIO-BIC-ILK1 
DIO-BIC-ILK2 
TX-DIG-IO CCF of transmissions from 
digital IO board 
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 Appendix C: Fault trees 
This appendix describes the fault trees of the TCDQ. The description is given in term of 
scope, with the list of components (systems) that contribute to the failure of the top event.  
TCDQ FAILURE 
The scope of the fault tree of Figure 6 consists of two branches, plus the human error branch, 
included in the sensitivity analysis. The description of the fault tree is in Table 11. 
Table 11: Failure events of the TCDQ failure fault tree. 
Top event ID Top event description Systems and 
components 
modeled 
Functions involved  
TCDQ 
TRACKING 
Models the failure in automatic (or remote) 
mode of the TCDQ when tracking beam 
position. Failure may be in the block to 
move into the desired position due to a 
mechanical failure, a failure of motor 1 or 
motor 2 or a failure in the control 
electronics. Supervision and ILK functions 
are included. 
TCDQ block 
Motor 1 and 2 
Motor drive 






Set points table 
Timing card 
Calculation of control 
signal and transmission 








Potentiometer 1, 2 
LVDT 1, 2 
ILK function for block 
failure, position 
threshold and feedback 
comparison for motor 1 
and 2 on the basis of 
position set points 
TCDQ SERVO-
HOLD 
Models the failure in automatic servo 
mode of the TCDQ to stay in the calculated 
position. Failure may be in the power 
converter of motor 1 and 2 and control 
electronics (spurious controls). Supervision 
and ILK functions are included. 






Op set points 
Timing card 
 
Calculation of control 
signal and transmission 
to motor 1 and 2 on the 









Potentiometer 1, 2 
LVDT 1, 2 
ILK function for block 
failure, position 
threshold and feedback 
comparison for motor 1 
and 2 
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 MAN-POS-
ERROR 
Operator enters incorrect set points to 
TCDQ motors 




Models the possibility of working in the 
inappropriate remote mode when the 
system should be in servo mode. 
Operator 
PLC 
Release to servo 
ILK incorrect mode det. 
 
TCDQ-TRACKING 
The scope of the fault tree consists of the blocker and the two control loops (in servo mode) 
of DC motor 1 and DC motor 2, with the respective power converters, computation of 
control inputs by PID, feedback signals and position supervision. The tree is built tracking 
back the signal from the final element actuation (the TCDQ block) back to the actuator and 
the source of the control signal in the PLC. Failures of signal transmissions are included too. 
The fault tree is shown in Figure 8, with description in Table 12. 
 
TCDQ-TRACKING
TCDQ failure to track 
beam position in SERVO 
mode or manual 
TCDQ FAILURE
@TCDQ-MOTORS-1
Motors are not moving 
the block into the desired 
position
BLOCK-FAILURE
TCDQ block fails to reach 
the desired position
@TCDQ-MOTORS-3
Motor 1 fails to move the 
block into the desired 
position
@TCDQ-MOTORS-4
Motor 2 fails to move the 
block into the desired 
position
TCDQ-CTRL-SERVO-M1
Input signal to PARVEX 
motor drive 1 is incorrect
M1-PARVEX
Failure of pow er 
converter and M1 drive 
PARVEX
@TCDQ-MOTORS-2
Motor 1 does not receive 
the driving command 
from the motor drive 1
MOTOR1-FAILURE
Motor 1 fails to actuate
@GATE-55
Motor 2 does not receive 
the driving command 
from the motor drive 1
MOTOR2-FAILURE
Motor 2 fails to actuate
TCDQ-CTRL-SERVO-M2
TCDQ failure to control 
motor 2 w hen in SERVO 
mode
M2-PARVEX
Failure of pow er 
converter and M1 drive 
PARVEX
 









Table 12: Failure events of the fault tree TCDQ-TRACKING 
Top event ID Top event description Systems and 
components 
modeled 
Functions involved  
BLOCK 
FAILURE 
Models the failure of the block to 




Digital I/O board 
No block movement ILK 
TCDQ-CTRL-
SERVO-M1 
Models the failure of PLC control 
function to generate and transmit the 







Calculation of control signal 









ILK function for position 
threshold and feedback 
comparison for motor 1 
TCDQ-CTRL-
SERVO-M2 
Models the failure of PLC control 
function to generate the correct 







Controls calculation and 









ILK function for position 
threshold and feedback 
comparison for motor 2 
MOTOR1-
FAILURE 
Models the failure of DC motor 1 to 
actuate due to mechanical failure or 
incorrect calibration 
DC motor  1 
Calibration file 1 
End stop switch 1 
PLC CPU 
Digital I/O board 
Pos. threshold file 1 
Calibration file 1 
Motor 1 actuation 
Position threshold 1 ILK 
End stop 1 ILK 
No cal. File ILK 
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 MOTOR2-
FAILURE 
Models the failure of DC motor 2 to 
actuate due to mechanical failure or 
incorrect calibration 
DC motor  2 
Calibration file 2 
End stop switch 2 
PLC CPU 
Digital I/O board 
Pos. threshold file 2 
Calibration file 2 
Motor 2 actuation 
Position threshold 2 ILK 
End stop 2 ILK 
No cal. File 2 ILK 
M1-PARVEX Models the failure of the motor1 




MD1 power supply 
PLC CPU 
Digital I/O 
Pos. threshold file 1 
Power cabling 
Motor 1 driving 
Position threshold 1 ILK 
PS MD1 ILK 
Power cabling 
M2-PARVEX Models the failure of the motor1 




MD2 power supply 
PLC CPU 
Digital I/O 
Pos. threshold file 2 
Power cabling 
Motor 2 driving 
Position threshold 2 ILK 




The scope of the fault tree consists of the failure of the PLC to generate the control signal to 
the DC motor 1 when in servo mode, including signal transmission to the motor 1 power 
converter. The tree consists of two main branches, see Figure 9. The failure of the electronics 
is logically combined with the failure of the control signal, which is supervised. The 
description of the single fault trees with their scope is in Table 11. 
 
PLC-CTRL-SERVO-M1 
The scope of the fault tree consists of the failure of the PLC to generate the control signal to 
motor 1 when in servo mode. The failure can be caused by incorrect set-points as received 
from the MCS (by FESA application) as well as incorrect time reference from the timing 
system. This can be in the PLC PID software or in the PLC hardware. The tree consists of five 
branches at the same level, see Figure 10. The description is in Table 14. 
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 TCDQ-CTRL-SERVO-M1
Input signal to PARVEX 




Undetected failure in the 
transmission of the 
control signal from the 
PLC-CTRL-SERVO-M1
Incorrect CTRL-MD1 
control signal as 
generated by the PLC 
@GATE-647
Failure in the 
transmission of the 
control signal from the 
ILK-POS-THR-1
Failure to trigger ILK in 
case position threshold 
of motor 1 is exceeded
TX-AIO-MD1
TX failure of CTR-MD1 
signal from Analogue I/O 
board to Motor drive 1
AIO-CTR-MD1
The control signal 
CTR-MD1 is not 
generated at the output 
TX-PLC-AIO-MD1
TX failure of CTR-MD1 
signal from PLC (control 
function) to the Analogue 
 
Figure 9: Fault tree of PLC control function of motor 1 in servo mode (doubled triangles are CCF sets) 
PLC-CTRL-SERVO-M1
control signal as 




Undetected errors in the 
feedback position signal 
from motor 1 as 
@PLC-CTRL-SERVO1-2
Undetected SW failure of 
the PID control loop to 
calculate the control 
@PLC-CTRL-SERVO1-3
Undetected HW failure of 
the PLC to issue the 
control signal
PLC-TIMING
Incorrect time reference 





Incorrect or missing 
setpoints for motor 1 in 
servo mode
@PLC-CTRL-SERVO1-4
Failure to trigger ILK in 
case of incorrect position 
feedback of motor 1
M1-POS-FEEDBACK
Failure of feedback 
position of motor 1 as 
received at the PLC CPU
PLC-CTRL-SW1
SW Failure of the PID 
control loop to calculate 
the control signals for 
ILK-POS-THR-1
Failure to trigger ILK in 
case position threshold 
of motor 1 is exceeded
PLC-CTRL-HW
HW failure of the PLC to 
issue the control signal
ILK-POS-THR-1
Failure to trigger ILK in 
case position threshold 
of motor 1 is exceeded
ILK-POS-THR-1
Failure to trigger ILK in 
case position threshold 
of motor 1 is exceeded
ILK-LVDT-POT1
Failure to trigger ILK in 
case of disagreement 
betw een potentiometer 
ILK-MODE
Failure to trigger ILK in 
case of incorrect mode 
of operation
SWITCH-REMOTE-PLC
The PLC sw itches to 
REMOTE mode
 
Figure 10: Fault tree of the PLC control function of motor 1 in servo mode 
 
Table 13: Failure events of the TCDQ-CTRL-SERVO-M1 fault tree 
PLC-CTRL-
SERVO-M1 
Models the failure of PLC control 
function to generate the correct 




Set points table 
Timing card 
Calculation of control 









ILK function for position 
threshold and feedback 
comparison for motor 1 
 36 [2009-03] 
 ILK-POS-
THR-1 
Models the failure of the PLC interlock 
function to trigger the ILK to BIC in case 




Digital I/O board 
Threshold table 




Models the failure of the transmission 
from the Analogue IO board to the 
motor drive (PARVEX) power converter 
of motor 1 
TX from Analogue I/O 
output to MD1 input 
Control signal motor 1 
AIO-CTR-
MD1 
Models the failure of the analogue IO 
board to present the control signal of 
motor 1 at its output  
Analogue I/O board 
output and analogue I/O 
board 
Control signal motor 1 
TX-PLC-
AIO-MD1 
Models the TX failure of control signal 
of motor 1 from the PLC to the analogue 
I/O board 
PLC Profibus internal 
communications 




Table 14: Failure events of PLC-CTRL-SERVO-M1 






Models the failure of the PLC interlock function 
to trigger the ILK to BIC in case the position 
threshold of motor 1 is exceeded 
PLC CPU 
Bus communications 
Digital I/O board 
Threshold table 
Position threshold 
ILK of motor 1 
ILK-LVDT-
POT1 
Models the failure of the PLC interlock function 
to trigger the ILK to BIC in case the 
potentiometer and the LVDT disagree 
PLC CPU 
Bus communications 
Digital I/O board 
Position 




Models the failure of the feedback position 
signal of motor 1 as measured by the 
potentiometer and received at the PLC CPU 
Potentiometer 1 




signal motor 1 
PLC-CTRL-
SW1 
Models the failure of the PID control program 







PLC-CTRL-HW Models the failure of the PLC CPU to issue the 




Output of Control 
signal motor 1 
ILK-POS-THR-
1 
Models the failure of the PLC interlock function 
to trigger the ILK to BIC in case the position 
threshold of motor 1 is exceeded 
PLC CPU 
Bus communications 
Digital I/O board 
Threshold table 
Position threshold 
ILK of motor 1 
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 PID-SETPOS1-
SERVO 
Models incorrect or missing set point of motor 1 




Set points table 
PID control motor 
1 
ILK-MODE Model the failure to detect the spurious switch 
from servo to remote mode 
PLC CPU 
Bus communications 
Digital I/O board 
Incorrect operation 
mode ILK 
PLC-TIMING Models the incorrect time reference as received 
from the timing system 





Models the spurious change of mode from 
servo to remote 





Logic description is identical to the TCDQ-CTRL-SERVO-M1 as well as PLC-CTRL-SERVO2 




The scope of the fault tree consists of the control chain. Motors and blocker are excluded. The 
TCDQ may leave the required position for a spurious undetected movement, as it is 
generated in the PLC, or in the PARVEX motor drives. The tree is built tracking back the 
signal from the motor drives back to the source of the control signal in the PLC. Failures of 
signal transmissions are included too. The fault tree is shown in Figure 11, with description 
in Table 16. 
 
TCDQ-CTRL-SPURIOUS-1 
The scope of the fault tree consists of the failure of the TCDQ motor 1 which moves actuated 
by a spurious control from PLC or a failure of the respective motor drive. The tree consists of 
four trees and two basic events (spurious control generated in the motor drive), see Figure 12 
and description in Table 16. The fault tree PLC-SPURIOUS-M1 is in Figure 13. 
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 TCDQ-SERVO-HOLD
TCDQ failure due to 




Motor1 moves TCDQ out 
of required position
@TCDQ-SERVO-HOLD-8
Motor2 moves TCDQ out 
of the required position
@TCDQ-SERVO-HOLD-7
Undetected error of the 




spurious position change 
of TCDQ at the motor 1 
ILK-POS-THR-1
Failure to trigger ILK in 
case position threshold 
of motor 1 is exceeded
MD1-SPURIOUS
Motor drive 1 generates 
an incorrect control signal
@TCDQ-SERVO-HOLD-9
Undetected HW failure of 
the PLC to issue the 
control signal
TCDQ-CTRL-SPURIOUS-2
Controls trigger change 
of position of TCDQ at 
the motor 2 pow er drive
ILK-POS-THR-2
Failure of triggering ILK in 
case position threshold 
of motor2 is exceeded
MD2-SPURIOUS
Motor drive 2 generates 
an incorrect control signal
 





Table 15: Failure events of TCDQ-SERVO-HOLD 
Top event ID Top event description Systems and 
components 
modeled 
Functions involved  
TCDQ-CTRL-
SPURIOUS-1 
Models the failure of PLC control 
function to generate and transmit a 





Calculation of control 








ILK function for position 
threshold and feedback 
comparison for motor 1 
TCDQ-CTRL-
SPURIOUS-2 
Models the failure of PLC control 
function to generate and transmit a 




Controls calculation and 
transmission to motor 2 
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ILK function for position 
threshold and feedback 
comparison for motor 2 
ILK-POS-THR-
1 
Models the failure of the PLC interlock 
function to trigger the ILK to BIC in 




Digital I/O board 
Threshold table 




Models the failure of the PLC interlock 
function to trigger the ILK to BIC in 




Digital I/O board 
Threshold table 




Models the failure of the motor1 power 
converter (PARVEX 1) that generates a 








Models the failure of the motor1 power 
converter (PARVEX 2) that generates a 










spurious position change 
of TCDQ at the motor 1 
@GATE-703
Undetected failure in the 
transmission of the 
control signal from the 
PLC-SPURIOUS-M1
Generation of incorrect 
spurious controls by the 
PLC
@GATE-704
Failure in the 
transmission of the 
control signal from the 
ILK-POS-THR-1
Failure to trigger ILK in 
case position threshold 
of motor 1 is exceeded
TX-AIO-MD1
TX failure of CTR-MD1 
signal from Analogue I/O 
board to Motor drive 1
AIO-CTR-MD1
The control signal 
CTR-MD1 is not 
generated at the output 
TX-PLC-AIO-MD1
TX failure of CTR-MD1 
signal from PLC (control 
function) to the Analogue 
 
Figure 12: Fault tree of the PLC control function of motor 1  
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 PLC-SPURIOUS-M1
Generation of incorrect 




Undetected errors in the 
feedback position signal 
from motor 1 as 
@PLC-SPURIOUS-M1-3
Undetected SW failure of 
the PID control loop to 
calculate the control 
@PLC-SPURIOUS-M1-4
Undetected HW failure of 
the PLC to issue the 
control signal
@PLC-SPURIOUS-M1-2
Failure to trigger ILK in 
case of incorrect position 
feedback of motor 1
M1-POS-FEEDBACK
Failure of feedback 
position of motor 1 as 
received at the PLC CPU
ILK-POS-THR-1
Failure to trigger ILK in 
case position threshold 
of motor 1 is exceeded
ILK-LVDT-POT1
Failure to trigger ILK in 
case of disagreement 
betw een potentiometer 
PLC-CTRL-SW1
SW Failure of the PID 
control loop to calculate 
the control signals for 
ILK-POS-THR-1
Failure to trigger ILK in 
case position threshold 
of motor 1 is exceeded
PLC-CTRL-HW
HW failure of the PLC to 
issue the control signal
ILK-POS-THR-1
Failure to trigger ILK in 
case position threshold 
of motor 1 is exceeded
 








Table 16: Failure events of the fault tree PLC-CTRL-SPURIOUS-1 
Top event ID Top event description Systems and 
components modeled 
Functions involved  
ILK-POS-
THR-1 
Models the failure of the PLC interlock 
function to trigger the ILK to BIC in case the 
position threshold of motor 1 is exceeded 
PLC CPU 
Bus communications 
Digital I/O board 
Threshold table 
Position threshold 








Digital I/O board 
Calculation of 
position controls 
TX-AIO-MD1 Failure of control signal from the analogue 
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AIO-CTR-
MD1 
The control signal is not generated at the 
output (failure leading to a spurious) 





Models the failure of the PLC CPU to issue 
the calculated control signal to analogue I/O 
board (leading to spurious) 
PLC internal board to 
board communication 
Output of control 
signal motor 1 
 
INAPPROPRIATE-REMOTE 
The fault tree models the TCDQ in the inappropriate remote mode when it should be in 
servo mode. This may happen every time the operator asks for the control and then missed 
to release it leaving the TCDQ without automatic controls. The fault tree consists of two basic 
failure events: 1) failure of the operator to release the control into servo mode and 2) the 
missed detection of incorrect mode of operation. The first failure event is undeveloped. 
  
